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Shortly, once a person is alleged to have committed a crime the law insists tdat it is a matter for organized society, in the form of a court, to decide what steps are necessary to protect society, whether the alleged offender be mentally affected or not, and that this cannot be left to the medical practitioner or the lawyer alone.
In civil courts the position is clearly defined and may be taken to be understood by the professional lawyer who guides or assists the court, but considerable difficulties have been encountered by military courts, which usually have no special legal knowledge nor the assistance of a lawyer, in deciding how to reconcile the medical views with the legal. In the civil courts if a person is accused of a crime, after a preliminary investigation by a magistrate he is then committed for trial and tried, if at all, either by a court of quarter sessions or an assize court, either of which would be presided over by a very experienced lawver who would direct the court on law and in each of which the decisions are made by a jury; and from these courts there is an appeal to the court of criminal appeal. Army procedure differs in a number of ways. If a soldier is accused of an offence there is a preliminary investigation by his commanding officer and a summary of evidence, which corresponds to the depositions in a civil court, is taken. If the commanding officer decides that there is a case to be tried he remands the soldier for trial by court-martial and forwards the charge, together with the summary of evidence, to a senior officer, usually his Brigade Commander, who then decides whether or not he will convene a court to try the soldier. If he decides that the soldier should be tried, he then convenes a court-martial for the trial. In the great majority of cases this court will be composed of three regimental officers with no legal experience and with no legal assistance and this court sits both as judge and as jury. The decisions of this court, however unless they find the accused not guilty-have no legal effect until they have been considered by a confirming officer, who is normally the same person as the convening officer, and he can refuLse confirmation which wvould act as an acqUittal-or he can reduLce anv sentence. or remit it altogether, and he can if he so wishes direct that the sentence shall not begin to operate until it has been reviewed again by a superior military authority. After the confirming officer has dealt with the case the proceedings are then reviewed for the first time by a lawyer, a member of the Judge Advocate General's Department, who will advise the superior militarv authority to whom the proceedings are next referred, on any legal point which may arise, and the superior military authoritv, usually a Divisional or Corps Commander, may qUash the finding of gulilty if he thinks fit, or may remit or reduce anv sentence or may suspend the sentence. The proceedings are again reviewed by the Judge Advocate General when thev reach the War Office for final disposal.
Every person accused of a crime is presumed bv law to be sane and legallv responsible
SiEPT.-PSYCH. I Proceedings oJ the Royal Society of Medicine 2o for his actions until the contrarv is proved by evidence, but the law recognizes three classes of persons as not mentally normal, and each class is carefullv defined and in the civil courts a procedure is laid down for their discovery and treatment. All other persons are treated as being fully responsible to society for their actions. The classification is:
(a) Persons unfit to stand trial owing to their being found to be insane after their committal for trial or at the time of their trial. (b) Persons who are insane at the time of the commission of the alleged offence. (c) Mental defectives within the meaning of the Mental Deficiency Acts.
Persons un1fit to stand trial owinig to nmenttal disaibility may be subdivided into: (i) Persons committed for trial who before they can be tried are certified to be insane. The Criminal Lunatics Acts, 1884, empower the Secretary of State to remove such person to a lunatic asylum and detain him as a criminal lunatic until he is either committed to prison or discharged. (ii) Persons brought before a court and before any plea is recorded found to be insane by a jury empanelled for the purpose. The issue which the jurv is directed to try is as follows: "whether the person is of sufficient intellect to comprehend the course of the proceedings of the trial so as to make a proper defence and challenge a juror to whom he might wish to object and to understand the details of the evidence.> In the event of the accused being so found he is in fact treated as a criminal lunliatic and the trial of course does not proceed.
Personzs foutnid to be inisante at the time of the commission of the alleged offence.-If a person is found to be fit to plead the trial will proceed normally but the defence cail raise the issue that the accused, although he committed the act or omission constituting the offence, was inisane so as not to be responsible according to law for his actions at the time. In this case: " the jury ought to be told that every man is presumed to be sane and responsible for his crimes until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction, and that to establish a defence on the grounds of insanity it must be clearly proved that at the time of the commission of the act the party accused was labouring under such defect of reason from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and qualitv of the act he was doing or if he did know it that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.
If the jury accept this view they will return a special verdict to the effect that the accused is guilty of the act or omission charged against him but was insane at the time when he did the act or made the omission, and the court will order the accused to be kept in custody as a criminal lunatic until His Majesty's pleasure shall be known.
Mental defectives. The legal definition of a mental defective is contained in the Mental Deficiency Acts and includes idiots, imbeciles, fe-2ble-minded persons and moral defectives. For the purpose of the above definition mental defectiveness means a condition of arrested or incomplete development of mind, existing before the age of 18 years, whether arising from inherent causes or induced by disease or injury.
Mental deficiency not amounting to legal insanity is not regarded as an excuse for crime but only as a matter to be considered in the question of the subsequent treatment of an offender after he has been found guilty. A mental defective is tried in the same way as any other prisoner but if the court before whom any person is charged with a criminal offence punishable, in the case of an adult, with penal servitude or imprisonment, is satisfied on medical evidence that he is defective within the meaning of-the Act, the court may either postpone passing sentence and direct that a petition be presented under the Act, or, in lieu of passing sentence, itself make an order committing the accused person to an institution for defectives or to be placed under the guardianship of some person. A duty is placed on the prosecution to bring before the court such evidence as to an accused person's mental condition as may be available if it appears to them that any person charged with an offence is a defective. Where the greatest difficulty arises, I think, is in the difference of the meaning of mental defective to a lawver and to a psychiatrist. I have argued this question with several psychiatrists, and am satisfied that it is the different usage of this phrase that leads to the greatest confusion. To a lawyer there are only three classes of persons, sane, mental defective and insane, and if a mental defective in the medical sense is so defective as to fall within the legal definition of insanity, to a lawyer he ceases to be a mental defective although to a doctor he remains one. This has led to endless argument but I think that if it is once realized that to a lawyer a mental defective simply means a person who falls within the definition of mental defective contained in the Mental Deficiency Acts, and who is not so defective as to fall within the classification of insanity, the position becomes clear, and during the rest of this paper I use the phrase " mental defective" purely in its legal sense.
To a certain extent the considerations affecting the decisions as to whether a person should or should not be tried by court-martial are dissimilar from those to be considered in deciding wvhether a civilian should be tried before the civil courts. A military court is concerned with the ntaintenance of military discipline and a military convening officer is entitled to take into account many questions of convenience, expedience and expense which are not the concern of the civil authorities under similar circumstances, and to say, if he considers that it is unnecessarv for the purpose of military discipline, that he will not waste the time of military personnel in trying a soldier even though he be guilty of a civil offence. Military procedure in respect of persons unfit to plead or insane at the time of the commission of the offence is preciselv similar to civil procedure. Mental defectives, however, are not dealt with at all under either the Army Act or the Rules of Procedure, but as I have already explained there are two further stages in military procedure which are missing in civil procedure, namely, confirmation and review with the powers of remission and suspension inherent therein and of course the final power of discharge from the Army.
It will be seen from the above that in lawv only insanity is the concern of the court before the question of guilt is determined. Mental deficiency is never a defence but merely a matter to be taken into account in deciding on the treatment of a delinquent after conviction. The following principles therefore follow: (i) Both insanity and mental deficiency are matters which concern the convening officer when deciding whether or not to convene a court-martial. (ii) Insanity only and not mental deficiency concerns the court when deciding whether a soldier is fit to stand his trial; (iii) Insanity only concerns the court prior to a finding of guiltv; (iv) Mental deficiency may concern the court, subject to what is suggested hereafter, when determining the sentence of the court;
(v) Mental deficiency is always the concern of the confirming officer when considering the subsequent treatment of a soldier found guilty by court-martial. A recent Army Council Instruction lays down that the unit medical officer must give a certificate as to both the physical condition of the soldier and also his mental condition before application for trial is made, and if either he or the soldier's commanding officer considers that the soldier's mental condition should be investigated, he will obtain a psychiatrist's report. The psychiatrist's report goes to the convening officer with the application for trial, and in this report is set out the answers to a series of questions giving his definite opinion as to whether a soldier is fit to plead within the meaning of the legal definition, whether he was, in his opinion, at the time of the commission of the act insane within the definition laid down in the McNaughton Rules, and further, even though he thinks he is both fit for trial and sane at the time of the commission of the offence, his views on his general mental condition, and the effect which might be expected to result from trial and/or punishment, and lastly his fitness to continue to serve in the Army.
If there is any suggestion that the soldier is insane or mentally defective, the case together with the report is submitted to an officer of the Judge Advocate General's Department, and after receiving his advice the convening officer can then decide whether in the light of the information disclosed in the report it is in his view necessary for the pLurpose of discipline to convene a court-martial. If a soldier is reported to be insane, plainly no court-martial would be convened until he had been before a medical board, -and the question of his insanity decided by the board. If he is reported to be mentallv defective it would then be a matter for the convening officer to decide whether to apply for his discharge under the provisions of King's Regulations 390 or whether it is desirable that he should be tried and the question of discharge considered at a later stage. If trial is once ordered by the convening officer and at the trial either the prosecutor or the defending officer raises the issue that the accused is unfit to plead, evidence is called and the court hears and decides the issue on the evidence brought before it and it should not accept reports or other inadmissible evidence.
If the defending officer raises the issue of insanity at the time of the commission of the offence the court should proceed strictly on the evidence and should not accept any medical reports or other documents inadmissible in evidence, bearing in mind that it is for the defence to prove the insanity.
In the event of a finding of guilty the court should accept, if the defence wish to put it forward, any evidence of mental deficiency and for this purpose they may properly accept a report from a psychiatrist de bene esse and take this evidence into consideration -together with other factors in deciding upon their sentence.
When the proceedings are forwarded to the confirming officer, this officer then considers, taking into account the medical reports before him, wvhether or not he should recommend a susnension of the sentence pending an application for the accused's discharge, or whether he should allow the soldier to proceed to the detention barracks in the ordinary wav, drawing the attention of the commandant to the soldier's mental condition in accordance with King's Regulations 691 (c) and notifying this action in the covering minute attached to the proceedings in,. accordance with King's Regulations 702.
The whole essence of the procedure is to ensure as far as possible (a) that the question of a soldier's fitness for trial is decided by the convening officer with the assistance of the psychiatric specialist and the legal specialist before the court is convened at all; (b) that the question of the soldier's responsibility for the crime is tried on proper evidence at the trial and that only genuine legal insanity is allowed to interfere with a finding of guilty or not guilty; (c) that any question of mental irresponsibility short of legal insanity is properly considered not in the atmosphere of a court-martial but after the trial by the confirming officer again with the assistance of the legal and psychiatric specialists before the soldier in fact receives any punishment.
Another problem is the question of the disposal of a mentally defective soldier who is not certifiably insane. At present he is merely discharged from the Army and left to his own devices, and as often as not re-enlists. I understand that conversations are taking place between the War Office and the Home Office or the Board of Control to deal with this aspect of the problem.
Lawyers have always been ready and willing to have a revision of the McNaughton Rules, and it is the medical profession who has failed to agree upon any new definition.
In practice the present definition appears to work very well, and it is left in every case in civil law to a jury of ordinary men, in military law to a court of ordinary military officers, to apply their common sense to the problem of responsibility. In my own experience it is seldom that a man who is really not responsible for his actions is convicted of any offence and indeed it is much more often that a man who is really responsible escapes.
The assessment of responsibility in naval offenders.-As psychiatrist to a Royal Naval Barracks i4 has been my duty for the past year to examine all offenders where doubt exists that the individual was not responsible for his offence in virtue of mental abnormality. Sometimes this disorder is so apparent that the case is referred by the authorities before disciplinary action is taken, in others the plea of mental disorder is raised by the individual himself when charged. In the latter case the man is informed that he may have the benefit of a psychiatric opinion. In some cases the plea is, often obviously, a mere pretext and the alternative of a period in cells is preferred to exposure as a humbug and the possible gibes of his mates. Optimism, however, is a striking characteristic of the naval rating and a number of bogus cases reach me in the hope that punishment may at least be mitigated. The psychiatrist has no harder task, nor any greater responsibility than the assessment of the imputability of offenders whether Service or civilian.
The degree of care and thoroughness must be as great in each. There are, however, certain circumstances which would appear to modify the doctor's attitude to the Service case, an attitude which may again be slightly modified according to whether the offence occurs in peace or in-war. Many civilian practitioners called up for service especially those accustomed to private practice, do not appreciate that the only concern of the Service with regard to the medical treatment of an individual, is "can this man be made fit for service or not?'". In the latter case he is of no further interest to the Service and must be invalided. In warfare, especially total warfare, this attitude is heavily underlined. Under present conditions, especially in the Services, the individual is of much less account than the community. That it is this doctrine we are supposed to be resisting with all our strength has been a frequently remarked paradox. This position of the individual is of significance with reference to "Crime ". We must be clear for practical purposes whether responsibility exists in a given cdse, or is diminished as the result of a morbid mental state. We are thus concerned with what is called psychological responsibility. Any definition of imputability, as Kinberg (1941) has recently pointed out in a distinguished analysis, is unsatisfactory. We are accordingly thrown back for guidance on a detailed and intimate knowledge of psychiatry. The greater our knowledge of psychiatry and psychopathology, and, one might add, the more we know of men and women, the more likely are we to give a correct judgment.
Certain differences in general between Service and civil crime must be considered. The former concerns as a rule offences which are on a different plane from many of those on which we are asked to advise in civil practice. Thus desertion is a very different matter from rape or crimes of violence. Desertion appears a technical offence and in peace time might seem to be entirely so, but since the function of a fighting service is the preparation for war, and the maintenance of a strict discipline is necessary to this end, desertion, even in peace time, cannot be regarded merely as a technical offence. Even in peace, the penalty must be severe, but in war, where the whole community is in danger it acquires a greater moral significance, both on account of its possibly graver consequences and because of the increased sensitiveness of public opinion towards any purposive hindrance to the war effort. In war, the orientation not merely of the executive, but also of the psychiatrist wvhere crime is concerned, mList be persistentlv towvards the community and the individual's claims must be assessed in this light. In assessing the responsibility in the individual case, the corrigibilitv of the offender and the deterrence of others are questions which seem to have a sharper and more immcdiate significance than in civil practice. True, civil punishment has b)oth a corrective and a deterrent fuLnction. It is, however, more general and abstract in its operation. In a ship or establishment, a number of men are grouLped together in close contact and knit bv firm dliscipline. If a man offends and is puLnished all the others will hear the details of the offence and the punishment awarded. Any laxitv in (lealing with offenders is likely to be followedl b1 an increase in crime. Whether or not an individual ptlnished for emibezzlem-ient in Plymoulth will deter another abouLt to attempt this in Aberdeen is dloLbtfuli. One offender punished for desertion in a ship mav dleter 50 others. In general, Service ptunishment wouLld appear to be successful in its aims.
It is therefore essential that the psychiatrist shotild not create a breach in this system, that he should not form a weak link in the chain, in partictlilar out of consideration for the wvelfare of the individual, as against the commuLnity. He must decide in any given case (1) whether, even if psvchiatric disorder exists, punishment is likelv to deter him from repeating the offence;
(2) what the effect on general discipline is likely to be if this man escapes ptunislhment; (3) is punishment likely to make his state worse and thus make him less likely to be an efficient rating, or will it have lasting evil consequLences to himself? Clearh' in the case of a self-reproachful depression the first requirement might be satisfied; the effect on general discipline of the puLnishment of an obviouisly sick man is likelv, if anything, to be bad, and with regard to (3) it is at least not likely to improve his state. This is an extreme and absturd instance. It is, however, otherwise wvith many psychopaths. Nlany of their mates regard them as responsible and failuLre to pulnish them would have in time an adverse effect on morale as well as bringing psychiatry into contempt and disrepuLte among all ranks.
The psychiatrist in a barracks should enjov widespread confidence, and his wvork should be free from the suspicioIn of sentimentalitv and hocus-poctus. Punishimient in manv of these cases is likely to suicceed in the first aim, i.e. deterrence, and the indivictlual's contdition is not likelv to be made worse by ptunishmlent. I am strongly of the opinion that, in the case of manv hvsterical offenders punishment shouLld precede treatment. In this wvay, the grouind is clearetl for fulture therapy and one motive for the reaction is removed.
To some of tis there appears to have been an tindtllv tolerant attittlde to some forms of psvchopathv in recent vears, due perlhaps to the flabbv an(d uncritical acceptance at face valUe of certain psychopathological doctrines and perhaps also to a greater slackness in ouLr moral fibre in the inter-war vears. In psychotherapT the individual's comfort seems to be given more thought thani that of his entouLrage which is often regarded with indifferenice. Thuts it has been sought to take the " stigma " from hysteria. That this may be undesirable, for example, in certain cases of effort syndrome " has been shown by Pauil Wood (1941) . The Service psychiatrist will do wvell to see to it that the way of the hvsteric shall be hard anid the profit be withdrawn from psvchopathv. In one year 662 patients were seen in the Psvchiatric Department. Of these, 56, or approximately 8-50' were offentders. The series included two officers. 760' of the offences concernetl desertion and leave breaking. Six showved no psychiatric disorder.
Hvsterical and affective reactions were associated with desertion more frequentlv than other forms, but the rather loxv incidence of hysterical states and reactions was surprising, for the hvsterical deserter is usually regarded as the prototvpe of the psychopathic Service offender. Affective states were, however, actuallv as comnmon. In 28 (500%) of the cases, no interference with punishment was recommended. In aniother 5 it was recommended that punishment might be modified. A uisefuLl case, illUstrating some points in the assessnment of responsibilitv is that of a man, a supplv P.O. aged 25. who wvas charged with having created a disturbance, and of having damaged certain propertv. The previous evening he had druLnk 4 to 5 pints of beer betveen 5.30 and 10 p.m. It was stated that he had conversed normally at 10 p.m. He then went to the clothing store where he slept and after that did not remember anvthing of what happenied. He said " mv mind sort of wvent blank ". He recalled that, soon afterwards, he ha(l seen the (lamage he had done and remembered the escort arrivinug to take him to cells. He said " everything was (quiite ordinarv afterwvards He understood perfectlv w%Nhat he had to do and say. He was not charged vith druinkenness. He had no memorY of the period between entering the store and seeing the damage he had done. He stated that the amou-nt of alcohol was for him not excessive.
He gave a history of one previouis episode of violence after drinkinig dturing which he had assaulted a policeman. The quantity of alcohol was said to have been greater on -this occasion. As a child he had shown several psychopathic traits. His father had been a periodic drinker and his mother had had a depressive illness after his father's death. This man was recommended for invaliding which was carried out. It was considered that punishment in this case would have little deterrent effect since it was improbable he would abstain, and that having regard to his history and the likelihood of similar behaviour again perhaps after a small dose of alcohol, he was unlikely to be suitable for further service. The effect of his invaliding on morale was probably good, since the man was a senior rating and was deeply perturbed at the decision. His mates of equal seniority with good prospects in the Service probably also regarded the matter with concern. Also in view of the relatively small amount of alcohol taken and the unpredictability for him of its effects, he could not be regarded as responsible for having offended through his own negligence.
The hysterical amnesic reactions as a rule, are of the thinnest, and it is usually possible, by the ordinary methods of the interview, to demonstrate in nearly all cases their partial character. This amnesia is of course a situational reaction and as such implies some degree of realization of wrongdoing. The patients very often remember a good deal of what they did during the alleged blank period. One's impression is that these amnesiac are mostly more spurious than those met in civilian practice. They demonstrate, often nakedlv, the shifting character of the boundary line between conscious deception, i.e. malingering, and deception which is less conscious, if this phrase may be permitted. This is most evident in hysterical pseudo-dementia. These individuals often show an extieme capacity for self-deception and considerably less for the deception of others. Such people are nearly always second-rate personalities, often of poor intelligence with unsatisfactory work records, a poor " health conscience "', and a lifelong tendency to evasion, but who have, up to date, shown no psychopathic episodes. They are shiftless and take the short view. They readily fall to the temptation to quit. Desertion is for them the easiest of all offences. In civil life, if they have shirked their responsibilities, work or family, the penalty for them has often been not so severe or at least immediately not so painful. In short they have got away with it, at least for a time.
Many first offenders in the Service, particularly new recruits, are unawvare of the rigouis of the punishment which awaits them for desertion. Some are, indeed, ouLtraged at the use of the word to describe their absence. Many of these when punished receive for the first time in their lives an immediately unpleasant and uncomfortable award and because they are so egocentric and susceptible to such discomforts, the effect of punishment is at least well worth trying. The problem of the habitual offender is different. In many cases it was unfortunate that they should have been accepted for the Service. Being in, however, there was nothing else to be done. Inivaliding was uindesirable since this was often just what they vanted and would react unfavourably on morale. Other modes of getting rid of them were equally undesirable. The problem of disposal will be referred to later.
Hvsterical pseudo-dementia in my experience is rare in civil life. In eleven vears I remember seeing only 4 cases. I have occasionally seen in civil life delinquent mental defectives who showed a pseudo-demential colouring to their oligophrenia. During two years in the Navy I have seen at least twice as many cases. Two of these have been recorded elsewhere (Anderson, 1941; Anderson and I\lallinson, 1941) . Despite carefuil study of this reaction I have been unable to make any essentially new observations. 1\Iost of them correspond to the classical descriptions, e.g. that of Wernicke, and Stertz (1910).
They have occurred in people of low intelligence and social level who in several cases gave a history of head injury. The theoretical problems raised bv this reaction are important and fascinating, but it is with its practical and medico-legal aspects we are concerned here. I mentioned earlier that the estimation of the degree to which conscious participation enters into the genesis of these states was extremelv difficult. It is practicallv impossible. One may think that this individual's reaction has more humbug about it than the other, but no more than that can be said. With most of them this element of humbug was strong. Most psychiatrists of experience would agree that feigned insanity is a rarity. I cannot recall ever having seen a case of pure simulation. WVhere the suspicion of simulation was strong I have never felt able to make a charge of malingering. This view has weighty support, e.g. by Kraepelin, Bleuler and Bumke. Bumke (1936) for example states: "The differentiation of psychogenic from exaggerated or pretended symptoms is fundamentally impossible. " He goes on to sav that the psychological mechanism involvedl in each is the same arid fturther that even demonstrable simulation does not rule out hvsteria. He admits that this conclusion involves a "painful renunciation". Bleuiler (1937) states that those who simulate mental disorder are nearlv all psychopaths and include some who actuallv are mentally disordered. that the mere demonstration of simulationi does not in itself indicate that the individual is sane or imputable. He again stresses the impossibility of drawing a dividing line between simulation and disease. The mentally defective in the Navy form a small group. As to the question of responsibility it is altogether too simple to suppose that because an individual has a mental age of less than 10, i.e. a Binet 1.Q. of less than 70, the standard by which, in practice, mental defect on the cognitive side is diagnosed, such an individual is thereby irresponsible. The question is complex; in civil life, the law is not clear on the point. Those charged with carrying out the provisions of the Mental Deficiencv Acts for local authorities usually advise one of the modes of disposal under these Acts, for such an individual convicted of an offence. In the majority of cases, this is the soundest and wisest procedure. I have, however, known judges to sentence an individual with a mental age of 8 or 9 to ptison, the legal decision pivoting, of course, on the question of responsibility. In one case I have in mind I think that the judge was right. When we turn to Service practice it may be stated as a fact that not a few individuals with a mental age of no higher than 8 are trainable for certain branches, e.g. seamen, and some have served at sea evidently without attracting attention. If there are no associated psychopathic features, many such might make more satisfactory ratings than some of their more intelligent brethren. When, after a period of service such an individual offends, his irrosponsibility cannot be assumed without more ado, merely on the grounds of his mental age. It mav very well be that, on the long view, such an individual is a risk and should properly be got ricd of bv invaliding from a Service which makes such exacting demands on the individual as does the Navy, but unless he shows inefficiency either sustained or intermittent, to such a degree that there are frequent or dangerous lapses, I would hesitate before recommending that he should be invalided. If therefore it is decided to do nothing against retaining him, and even in certain cases where it is, the question of his responsibility and ultimate punishment for an offence must be as carefully weighed as with anlv other offender referred to you. In some cases this elementary knowledge of right and wrong is present, and they have demonstrated in the past their capacity to obey, even under temptation to do otherwise. If this is so, and no psychopathic features, e.g. morbid anxiety, exist, their responsibility for the offence is very likely great enough to merit punishment. Naturally, it is impossible to lay down general guiding principles. It may very well be felt that sufficient opportunity to offend has not existed up to date, and that the individual concerned has been finally faced with a set of circumstances beyond his intellectual grasp and has taken the short wav out. If this is so, then he has proved himself, in virtue of his mental defect, incapable of effective service, and since a similar set of circumstances mav easily occur again, the proper course is to invalid him. This is the more usual train of events, but I must make it clear there are exceptions. Even when it is decided to recommend a defective offender for invaliding, you mav in virtue of his history to date including the offence, i.e. on a basis of fact, have arrived at the opinion that he is responsible. On the other hand, your belief that he is unlikely to be of further use to the Service is more tenuously grounded, i.e. is essentially a prediction. That again the influence on morale has a strongly determining part in the decision to punish is inescapable.
Lastly mention may be made of the affective changes which are reported in those who have been exposed to cataclysmic happenings, e.g. earthquakes (Biilz, Stierlin), and heavy prolonged enemy action. Thus, Larkworthy (1941) points out that in such circumstances men may be absent from their place of duty or slow in obeying orders and thus be unjustly blamed. In such cases, a remarkable apathy is the change described (affective stupor). The men tend to sit abouit and to take no interest or part in their surroundings. I have described a similar apathy in those who had been exposed to blast, where it seems it may sometimes last for months.
On the question of disposal of the habitual offender, punishment has proved ineffective in these cases and thev are a continual liabilitv or even menace. As far as this Service is concerned up till a month or two ago, the practical alternatives were invaliding, an obviouslv undesirable course, discharged " Unsuitable " which is regarded with disfavour as a way out, or discharged "Services no longer required" (SNLR). This method is a drastic one since it constitutes a life sentence. Such a man becomes unemployable by anv reputable employer for the rest of his life, and is marked ineligible for unemployment benefit. Thus the difficulties in the way of his rehabilitation are considerable.
That, on occasions, it has its advantages in respect of certain types of offender is not denied, and it is not suggested that the category should be abolished because, amongst other things, its existence has a probable deterrent effect. But many habitual offenders may be, and perhaps more often than we think are, corrigible. It seems unjust therefore not to offer such men the opportunity to mend their ways. For this purpose a Labour Camp has been instituted to wvhich the apparently incorrigible offender and many others, not always offenders, may be sent. I'he man will go there as a naval rating and be subject to ordinary naval discipline and will work for the common good. The camp has a naval medical officer with psychiatric experience. Since the conditions at this camp are designedly strenuous, it may be expected that a number will, after a longer or shorter period there, prefer to do their duty in the normal way. It seems to me this institution must necessarily have a penal character for which no justification need be offered since judicial punishment at the present dav, and increasingly so, has also a therapeultic aspect, perhaps drastic, but by and large, effective. It is in short " corrective ". It is too early vet to have ascertained even preliminarv results from this interesting experiment, which may well offer guidance after the war in the problem of the disposal of certain types of psychopath.
At present some offenders sentenced to longer terms of detention must do their punishment in civilian gaols. This is aln unlfortunate state of affairs wvhich has already drawn protest from Lady Astor in a recent letter to The Timnes. The naval correspondent of that newspaper replied shortlv afterxvards stating that separate detention quarters for naval offenders were being provided. That Service offenders are out of place in an ordinary civilian gaol was also remarked to me recently by the senior medical officer of one of our larger prisons.
In this paper it has been sought to show that in the assessment of the responsibilitv of naval offenders there is an inevitable shifting of the stress from the individual to the community, vet the rights of the individual are as carefullv regarded as is compatible wvitlh the necessarily restrictive framework of present-day conditions. The general background of this approach has been described and certain principles which have at least guided me have been outlined. No doubt, individual temperament and character condition to some extent our general attitude to the problems, xvhat must guide our particular approach to such cases is an objective scientific psychiatry, our knowledge of which in many instances will inevitablv not be deep enough. This knowledge is the decisive weapon for our task. This is essentially the view of Kinberg, who adds in the article already mentioned that "no jurisprudential philosophical speculations on so-called imputabilitv are needed . the conception of imputabilitv is a false abstraction, an inanimate conception, incapable of development which must be cancelled".
Major E. A. Bennet, R.A.M.C.: In the career of an alleged culprit there are several points at which it may be quLestioned whether or not he is to be held mentally accountable for his actions. Three of these are of special importance:
(a) When a commanding officer has to decide whether or not he will applv to the convening officer for the trial of a soldier unlder his command bv Field General CouLrt-Martial. (b) When a convening officer decides whethcr a person should or shoulId not be tried bv court-martial. (c) When an accused person is before a military court.
The assessment of mental responsibility appears to be governed by different criteria according to the stage reached in the proceedings. Once a prisoner is before a coturt a rigid principle in assessment of responsibilitv must be followed. But this needl not applv at the earlier stages. Therefore it will be convenient to consider the question of the assessment of mental responsibility (1) before and (2) after a soldier appears before a military court.
(1) Before a soldier is sent for a court-martial. the assessment of mental responsibility for his act or omission can be considered on a wide, common sense basis. It is recognized that many offenders can be dealt with apart from a court-martial, in a manner wbhich cannot injure military discipline.
Persons suffering from certain degrees of mental defect are likely to fall un(ler this heading. It has been found " that a disproportionately large fraction of the ' population' of military prisons and detention barracks is composed of men belowN average intelligence and that there is a disturbing incidence of men who are dutll and backward."
It is known that many of these persons have fallen into delinqtuency because they havTe been given work beyond their capacity and, in consequence, thev have become discouraged and emotionally disturbed.
A recent Army Council Instruction outlines the procedure which should be adopted in dealing with delinquents in the dull and backward group. This procedure is apparently working very well. In the future, it is hoped, no dull and backward person " shall escape appropriate classification" (ibid.) and investigation.
The assessment of mental responsibilitv in this group is in the hands of a commaniding officer or of a convening officer. Their decision, inevitably, is influenced by the result of selection tests, if known, and by the report of a military psychiatrist.
Another section of persons also falls into this pre-court-martial group, namely those thought to be suffering from psychoneurotic ailment. Unfortunately there is no procedure to deal with this group. A procedure similar to that now used for the dull and backward would be valutable. Tlhe vast majority of psychoneurotics should be sent for trial. But there are many exceptions. The sorting of this group is a difficult matter requiring common sense, psychiatric experience, and an appreciation of the part the disposal of such a dclinquient may play in the discipline and morale of his unit.
When a careful psychiatric investigation, which should consider appropriate corroborative material, reveals longstanding hysterical ailment in a person wvho puts forwvard loss of memory with wandering as an excuse for his misdeed, then it wVould seem that it is a waste of public money to make application for a couLrt-martial. With similar reservations, an act committed under the unconscious motivation in an obsessional neurosis might call for treatment in hospital rather than for a court-martial. Other conditions which so affect the mind as to redtuce responsibility to partial rcsponsibility, are fotund in confusional states, in schizoid episodes, and in certain classes of persons afflicted with recurrent endogenous depression. The use of the term " partial responsibilitv " is not unknowvn in the criminal courts in Scotland. There would seem to be excellent reasons, from a psychiatric point of view, for the use of this concept in the assessment of mental responsibility in the armed forces.
(2) The situation is entirely different once a soldier appears before a court-martial. Provided he is fit to plead and to stand his trial, and assuming that he knew what he was doing at the relevant time, and knew that it was wrong, then he will be convicted provided a case be proved against him.
The " test " here stated, and immortalized in the 'McNaughton rtules, leaves a court ro option in the assessment of mental responsibility. There is no halfwav house betwecn full responsibility and a criminal lunatic asylum.
That this " test " is not uniformlv satisfactory in practice is borne out by the spate of cases in which the interpretation of the McNaughton rules has been disputed.
The McNauLghton rules were drawn uIp in 1843, when psychology, as we know it to-dav, had not been born. Consequiently we get in the rules certain notions which no one nowv accepts such as the concept of partial insanity, reminiscent of the long abandoned facultv psychology. The law cannot operate in academic (detachment and apart from human beings. Bad psychiatry, such as that on which the rules are based, must assuredly result in bad law. Efforts have been made from time to time to amend the rtules. The most recent attempt appears to have been in 1922; and it is possible that it would have succeeded but for the fact that the proposed alteration failed to obtain official medical support.
The criterion used by a court in deciding upon the degree of mental impairment which frees a prisoner from criminal responsibility is, briefly, whether the prisoner possesses or lacks volition. Would the accuLsed have acted as he did tinder the eye of the A.P.M.?
Psychiatrists argue that there are persons of unsourld mental condition who do in fact commit acts, many of them criminal acts, which they detest. They do these acts under urges which are outsicle their consciotus control, and they act, knoNving that what thev do is wrong, legallv and morallv. Persons with an obsessional neurosis would fall in this category. The presence of a policeman at their elbow might or might not modifv their technique. But it would be simplifying the matter to an absurd degree to argue from this that thev possessed the power to avoid the act. The court, representing society, might feel that society had to be protected from such persons and might in consequence commit them to prison. On the other hand, if it could be shown that the person did in fact lack volition, it might be thought that it was a travesty of justice to commit the offender to prison.
Psvchiatrv in 1843 took no account of mental activitv outside consciousness. But psychiatry to-day is well aware of the value of this concept. In fact it is one of the main foulndations of modern psychological knowle(lge. In assessing responsibility, therefore, it would( seem that a court should be in a position to consider the viewv accepted bv psychiatrists that it is possible to distinguish between impulses which are not resisted and those which are irresistible. Clearlv it is essential to make this distinction, for everv crime, and indeed every act, is done under some impulse and the law sets out to compel people to resist certain impulses.
An act lacking intention could not be described as criminal. Consequentlv if it could be shown that the act of a person suffering from an obsessional neurosis was committed under the compulsion of an overriding motive, of which the person was unconscious and therefore powerless to resist, that act could not be said to be the result of conscious volition. An individual might be aware that his act was improper and even criminal, and yet it might be that he was powerless to resist the impulse to commit it. It is here contended that such an act lacks volition and for this reason it should not be punishable. The question of the responsibility of a person for an act would be assessed in the particular case by the court. The court being in possession of medical and other reports must decide the question of responsibility in precisely the same way that it decides any other fact and the law assumes responsibility until it is disproved.
Yet if the information given in psychiatric reports indicated that the prisoner, although not certifiably insane, lacked the power of control over his conduct, it is not possible, in the present state of the law, for a military court to act on such a report. They must proceed according to the rules laid down ninety-nine years ago.
After conviction, a military court can accept any evidence of psychiatric disability which the defence cares to put forward and this will be taken into consideration in deciding the sentence. This evidence is forwarded to the confirming officer who may suspend, mitigate, commute or remit the sentence as he considers just under all the circumstances.
This wise provision gives an opportunity to bring forwvard matters which might be taken into consideration by the court, prior to passing sentence. It is of practical value, in a psvchiatric report presented at this stage, to mention, as a rough grading, that extenuating circumstances were absent, slight, moderate, or strong.
The proceedings of a court-martial really become a two-stage operation. First the prisoner (assUming he is not insane) is tried, and if found guilty, the court then, but not before, may receive the assistance of modern knowledge in psychiatry before deciding upon a sentcnce. It is difficult for the layman to appreciate the necessity for this circumlocution. What in effect the court does, once a prisoner is deemed fit to stand his trial, is to disregard the only sort of information which can help them to decide whether as a fact, the prisoner is fully responsible for his action, until the prisoner is foulnd guilty. The difference in the legal anid medical concepts would seem to be that in the penal code crimes are certain acts defined in that code which are subject to penalty. And the penal law deals primarily, not with men but with acts of a certain kind. Medical men find it impossible to visuialize an act apart from the actor, just as they find it impossible to think of a disease apart from a sick person.
The assessment of mental responsibility must be decided by the court. It would seem therefore advantageous if the court were in a position to receive the tvpe of information it welcomes later, at the stage before the prisoner is found guilty.
The existence of a confirming officer and his function is, indeed, virtually an admission that a military court, bound as it is by the operation of the criminal law, is apt to adjudicate inadequately in these cases in which mental responsibility is in question.
Dr. W. Norwood East: In civil cases tried by juries at courts of quarter sessions or assizes there is no such verdict as: " Guiltv but mentally defective'" like there is of "Guilty but insane ". On the other hand, if the mental condition of a defective offender is such that he is unfit to plead he is dealt with as an insane person under the Criminal Lunatic Act 1800. The McNaughton rules are likely to remain effective until medical men can introduce an alternative test which juries can understand and evaluate. The existing rules are interpreted, in suitable cases, with elasticity as well as with wisdom so that justice is done. Evidence in regard to the mental condition of accused persons is not always given by expert psychiatrists, and injustice to the public might result if the evidence of an inexperienced medical witness were accepted without legal criteria. There can be no doubt, also, that medical evidence over-reaches itself sometimes and the relation between the mental condition of the defendant and the offence is discounted because the witness tries to prove too much. In the examination of an accused person who is insane it is important to ascertain whether he is also feigning insanity, and some of the most difficult cases are those in which the accused feigns sanity. Whilst no opinion is satisfactorv until all the available documentary evidence in the case has been studied the testimony mav be misleading until assessed in the light of the medical interview with the accused. I have felt for some time that progress regarding criminal responsibility will largely depend upon psychiatrists leaving this matter to the lawvers, whilst we concentrate our attention upon culpability from the medical aspect, and get better defined views as to what we mean by non-culpabilitv as well as more knowledge concerning the abnormal mental conditions which may properly be held to affect it.
